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Tiedeken: Contracts - Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code Not Inte
CONTRACTS-Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code Not Intended
to Apply to Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction. Jahn v. Burns, 593
P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979).

Suppose buyer A and seller B enter into a transaction.
After performance is complete, a dispute arises over the
amount of money that A owes to B. B claims that the debt
is $500, while A maintains that he only owes $400. A subsequently sends B a check for $450 with a notation stating:
"Settlement in Full for My Account." Before cashing the
check B crosses out A's notation and endorses the check:
"With Reservation of All My Rights." This hypothetical
describes the common situation of payment of a debt by
conditional check.'
The common question arising out of the above situation
pertains to the effect of B's attempt to reserve his rights
while at the same time cashing A's check. Under the common law, if the debt is undisputed in existence and liquidated, B need not try to reserve his rights since A cannot
relieve himself of full liability by sending a check for less
than an amount he legally owes.2 This is known as the preexisting duty rule which was first proposed in the English
case of Foakes v. Beer.' That case determined that a party
could not relinquish his obligation for full payment of a
debt even if a partial payment was bargained for in satisfaction of the original obligation.4 Or, in other words, a party
cannot undo what he is already legally obligated to do.
However, if the dispute between the parties is in fact an
honest one and the debt is unliquidated, then B's attempt
to reserve his rights will be to no avail because an accord
and satisfaction will occur.' Under the majority rule of
accord and satisfaction B's cashing of the check imputes his
assent to ,the conditions upon which it was delivered. Any
exercise of dominion over the proceeds by the creditor relinquishes any chances of recovering the full amount he
claims to be due.' The important point is that the doctrine
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming
1. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-12 (2nd ed. 1977).

2. Id. at § 4-10.
3. Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
4. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 1, at § 4-10 n. 3.
5. 1 AM. JUR. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction § 22 (1962).
6. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 1, at § 4-12.
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only applies to debts which are unliquidated and in dispute.'
Thus, where a debt is liquidated, an undisputed fixed sum,
an accord and satisfaction cannot occur.
With the adoption of section 1-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code' the law has become unsettled as to what
the answer to the above question is in relation to unliquidated debts.' The section reads in full:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights
performs or promises performance or assents to
performance in a manner demanded or offered by
the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights
reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice,' 'under
protest' or the like are sufficient.'
The main focus of debate is concerned with whether or not
this section of the Code was even intended to be applied
to the conditional check situation." This note will discuss
the various judicial interpretations given to the section,
and will suggest to the reader that the interpretation made
by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Jahn v. Burns is the
correct one."
FACTUAL SETTING OF JAHN V. BURNS

The case of Jahn v. Burns was the Wyoming Supreme
Court's first opportunity to rule on the applicability of
section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code to the conditional check situation." The dispute between the plaintiff
(Jahn) and the defendant (Burns) arose out of an automobile accident in which the parties were involved on February 10, 1978. Some time after the mishap, the defendant
mailed a letter with an accompanying cashier's check for
$200 to the plaintiff. Part of the letter stated: "I intend
7. Id.
8. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-126 (1977) is the Wyoming version of U.C.C. § 1-207.

For purposes of clarity this note will refer to the Wyoming section as
U.C.C. § 1-207.

9. Hawkland, The Effect of the U.C.C. § 1-207 on the Doctrine of Accord
and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 COMM. L.J. 329 (1969).

10. U.C.C. § 1-207 (1972 Text).
11. Hawkland, aupra note 9.

12. Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979).
13. See note 8, supra, for Wyoming Statutes citation.
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this check as payment in full for all personal and property
damages resulting from our accident of Feb. 10, 1978."'"
The defendant included a similar notation on the front of
the check which read: "Payment in full for all personal
and property damages resulting from our accident of Feb.
10, 1978."' After receiving the check, plaintiff crossed out
the notation and wrote on the back, "Deposited under protest and with full reservation of all my rights."' 6 The check
was then endorsed and cashed by the plaintiff. He then
brought an action in Fremont County District Court for
damages arising out of the accident. Defendant answered
the plaintiff's claim asserting the defense of accord and
satisfaction, and entered a motion for summary judgment.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that the plaintiff's acceptance and cashing of the check amounted to an
The Wyoming Supreme Court
accord and satisfaction.
7
decision.1
the
affirmed
THE REASONING OF THE COURT

In affirming the district court's holding the Wyoming
Supreme Court relied on the majority rule of accord and
satisfaction discussed above. Furthermore, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction was changed when the State adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1961.8 The court held in part
that U.C.C. section 1-207 was not intended to apply to the
situation at hand, and also that the tort claim was not a
"commercial transaction" within the meaning of the code.',
The plaintiff, appellant,, presented two arguments in
relation to the code: first, that U.C.C. section 1-207 was
designed to apply to the conditional, full payment check
situation; and second, that since a check was used, article 3
of the code brought the entire transaction within its scope.' 0
14. Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 829.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Uniform Commercial Code in Wyoming is contained in Wyo.
§ 34-21-101 through § 34-21-966 inclusive.
19. Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 830, 831.
20. Id. at 829.
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Under the "plain and ordinary" meaning rule"' the court
determined that section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code was not applicable to the facts of the case.2" According
to the court, the plaintiff's actions in cashing the check
while attempting at the same time to reserve his rights
amounted to a failure on his part to "assent to performance
in a manner.. . offered by the other party."2 The defendant
had only offered the check conditioned on the request that
the plaintiff accept it in full settlement, which he did not.
Furthermore, it was determined that the framers of the
code had no intention to apply section 1-207 to the situation
existing in this case. 4 Citing the official comments to the
section, the court concluded that the statute was designed
to protect the interests of a party to a contract who fears a
breach, while performance is still ongoing."5 As the comment
states: "This section provides machinery for the continuation
of performance along the lines contemplated by the contract
despite a pending dispute.""0 In the court's view it was not
proper to apply the section to the case since an accord and
satisfaction amounts to a new agreement between the parties,
and the section focuses on continuation of performance in an
already existing contract.2 7 Thus, not only did the plaintiff's
actions take him out of the protections afforded by section
1-207, but it was never intended to apply to the situation
to begin with.
Finally, the court dismissed the five cases cited by
plaintiff which had determined that section 1-207 of the
code was applicable to an accord and satisfaction claim. s
The important point was that in only one of the cases was
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

The Wyoming Supreme Court noted several of its prior decisions which
discuss this rule of statutory construction: Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v.
Emerson, 578. P.2d 1351 (Wyo. 1978); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977) ; Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872 (Wyo. 1976)
cert. den. sub. nom.
The text of WYO. STAT. § 34-21-126 (see note 8, supra) is identical to text
of U.C.C. § 1-207.
Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 830.
Id.
Id. at 831.
Official Comment No. 1 of U.C.C. § 1-207 (1972 Text) cited by the court
in Jahn v. Burns, supra note 8, at 830.
Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 831. The court also relied heavily upon
Hawkland's article cited supra note 9.
Id. at 831 n. 2. Some of these decisions are discussed infra.
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the section determinative, and in that case the South Dakota
Supreme Court noted that the minority rule with respect
to accord and satisfaction was controlling. 9 The minority
rule allows a party to protect his rights when cashing a
"full payment" check by obliterating or crossing out any
notations or by informing the debtor in some way of his
lack of assent."
In the second part of its opinion, the Wyoming Supreme
Court also rejected the plaintiff's claim under article 3 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. 1 Plaintiff was arguing that
since a negotiable instrument was used in the transaction,
her claim arising out of the accident fell within the coverage
of the code. The court concluded that simply because a check
is used in a transaction, it does not necessarily follow that
article 3 of the code automatically applies. It was first
necessary to determine whether a tort claim arising out of
an automobile accident fell within the scope of the code
itself.32 Since the code only pertains to "commercial transactions," the tort claim had to constitute just that. The
conclusion reached was that the tort action in the case did
not amount to a "commercial transaction," and the fact that
a check was involved did not make it one. 3 Hence, article 3
of the code was only designed to cover commercial transactions involving negotiable instruments, thus the plaintiff's
claim in the court's opinion fell outside the purview of the
entire code. 4
The court noted lastly that it had no duty under the
code to necessarily align its decisions with those of other
jurisdictions. The disposition of the case and the statutory
interpretations were deemed correct "whether or not there
35
be other determinations elsewhere on the issues considered.
29. Id., citing Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
30. Scholl v. Tallman, supra note 29, at 492 (citing Siegele v. Des Moines Mut.
Hail Ins. Ass'n, 28 S.D. 142, 132 N.W. 697 (1911)).
31. Article 3 of the U.C.C. is embodied in WYo. STAT. § 34-21-301 through
§ 34-21-379 inclusive.
32. Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 831.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 832.
35. Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 2, Art. 13

742

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN JAHN V. BURNS

Of the few jurisdictions which have been faced with
the question of section 1-207's applicability to the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction, the Jahn decision is the first to
determine that it should not apply." Although the Wyoming
Supreme Court is in no way compelled to follow the decisions
of other jurisdictions, the Jahn opinion lacks sufficient discussion as to why the prior interpretations of other courts
were considered wrong." This absence of reasoning suggests
that the interpretation of section 1-207 given in Jahn may be
limited to its particular set of facts, and that when faced
with a different situation the Wyoming Supreme Court
may yet apply section 1-207 to an accord and satisfaction
defense. The court not only failed to adequately discuss
prior interpretations, but relied too heavily upon one commentator's suggestions on the subject. 8
The first case relied upon by the plaintiff in Jahn was
a county court decision in New York which was never
appealed. In Hanna v. Perkins, the defendant had sent a
check to the plaintiff for services the plaintiff had rendered." However, due to a belief on his part that the plaintiff's negligence had caused damage to his proprety, the
defendant deducted $575 from the contract price. Plaintiff
brought an action to recover this amount, and the defendant
raised a defense of accord and satisfaction. Even though
the court did not rely on section 1-207 to decide the case,
it included in dictum a statement that the plaintiff's notation on the check, "Deposited Under Protest," would have
brought him within the coverage of the section.4" The court
was in essence saying that had it found the debt to be
unliquidated rather than liquidated, the terms of section
1-207 would have still protected the plaintiff from the
effects of an accord and satisfaction.
36. These other jurisdictions are: New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South
Dakota, and Florida.
37. Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 831.
38. Id. at 830, 831. See Hawkland, supra note 9.
39. Hanna v. Perkins, Westchester County Court, N.Y., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1044

(1965).
40. Id. at 1045.
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Another case containing similar dictum and also cited
by the plaintiff in Jahn was Ballie Lumber v. Kincaid."
In this case the defendant had bought some lumber from the
plaintiff, but had run into financial trouble before the bill
could be paid. With a balance of $2,447.67 remaining on the
contract, defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff offering to
pay him 35% of the total as full settlement. Plaintiff
accepted the offer conditioned on payment being made by
September 20, 1967. The defendant never met the condition
but did eventually pay the 35% by mid-1968. With each
of the two checks received the plaintiff reserved his rights
and deposited under protest. He then instituted an action
for recovery of the 65% of the bill yet unpaid.42 Here also,
the North Carolina court did not rely on section 1-207 to
decide the case because as a matter of law they held that
no accord and satisfaction had occurred. However, like the
New York court's interpretation in Hanna, the North
Carolina court noted that the plaintiff's actions were enough
to satisfy the requirements of section 1-207." 8
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court in Jahn was
correct in stating that section 1-207 was not determinative
of the holdings in both Hanna and Ballie Lumber, it failed
to mention the opposite interpretations given to section 1-207
by the respective courts." Possibly the lack of attention
given to the interpretations of the section centers on the
fact that both Hanna and Ballie Lumber arose out of commercial transactions, whereas the court concluded in Jahn
that a commercial transaction was not involved. Since the
court failed to explicitly dismiss these prior interpretations
as incorrect, the possibility still exists that if faced with a
case involving a commercial transaction rather than a tort,
a creditor may be able to resort to section 1-207 and avoid
an accord and satisfaction defense. It must be noted however, that neither the supreme court of North Carolina nor
New York has been faced with the issue. Thus the cases of
41. Ballie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 842, 167 S.E.2d
85 (1969).
42. Id. at 87-88.
43. Id. at 93.
44. Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 831.
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Hanna and Ballie Lumber may not reflect the law of their
respective states.
The plaintiff in Jahn also relied on the South Dakota
Supreme Court case of Scholl v. Tallman.45 The dispute in
this case arose between plaintiff, construction company, and
defendants, homeowners. Defendants claimed that all of
their payments made to plaintiff had not been properly
recorded, and that in fact they owed much less than their
account showed. In a move to settle, the defendants sent
plaintiff a check for $500, which included a notation:
"Settlement in Full for all Labor and Materials to Date.""'
Plaintiff cashed the check under protest, and brought an
action to recover the balance. Even though it was noted that
the minority rule with respect to accord and satisfaction
was still in effect in South Dakota, the case was not decided
under it." Rather, the South Dakota Supreme Court interpreted its own version of section 1-207 as allowing the
plaintiff to cash the check and to thwart the defendant's
defense of accord and satisfaction. 8 The interesting point
is that whether or not the South Dakota version of the
section embodies the minority rule of accord and satisfaction,
the court's interpretation of section 1-207 is entirely consistent with those in Hanna and Ballie Lumber. And both
New York and North Carolina are controlled by the same
majority rule with respect to accord and satisfaction that
Wyoming law reflects."9
Thus, the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the Jahn case
probably should have focused more on these prior interpretations of section 1-207 than on the actual holdings,
unless of course it intended Jahn to be given a narrow
reading. This is not to suggest that the Wyoming court's
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Scholl v. Tallman, supra note 29.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 493.

Id.
For other state court determinations of section 1-207 that reflect those in
Scholl, Ballie Lumber, and Hanna, while working under the majority rule
of accord and satisfaction, see Lange Finn Construction Co., Inc., v. Albany
Steel & Iron Supply Co., Inc., 403 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct. Albany County,
1978) ; Miller v. Jung, 361 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1978).
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interpretation is wrong, but merely to criticize the lack of
reasoning.
Finally, since the court in part I of its decision found
that Jahn's claim under section 1-207 was not valid, its
discussion of the article 3 argument seems unnecessary and
a limiting factor on the decision in its own right. 0 The
inconsistency occurs because on the one hand the court
determined that section 1-207 did not allow the plaintiff
to preserve her rights, and subsequently it determined that
since the case did not involve a commercial transaction it
fell outside the realm of the entire code."' The more logical
analysis would have been to first decide whether the code
applied at all, and if it did, the next step would have been
to rule on the section 1-207 claim. In actuality, if the case
fell outside of the code's scope, the plaintiff's argument
under section 1-207 had no basis, unless the court was
suggesting that article 1 of the code applies to non-commercial transactions as well. Thus the Jahn decision may
be limited to its particular facts. Arguably, all the court
decided was that since the code in general did not apply
to a tort claim where a check was used in settlement, then a
plaintiff's claim of reservation under section 1-207 could
not be valid. The possibility exists that on a different set
of facts the court will opt for an alternate interpretation
of section 1-207, which will apply it to the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction.
JAHN V. BURNS:

THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF

SECTION

1-207

No matter what the scope of the Wyoming Supreme
Court's decision in Jahn v. Burns, the most noteworthy
50. Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 831-832.
51. Id. at 831 where the court states:
Before applying the provisions of the Code, the question must
always be asked as to whether or not the transaction falls within
the scope of the Code. In this instance: Is the tort claim resulting
from the automobile accident a commercial transaction? Obviously,
it is not.
One court has applied the rule of Section 1-207 even though
there was a question in the case whether the transaction involved
was covered by the Code at all, in Ayer v. Sky Club, Inc., 27
U.C.C. Rep. 8811 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., App.Div. 1979). There it was
stated that although the billing dispute between the parties was
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aspect of the case is the interpretation of section 1-207 as
it relates to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Since
the enactment of the code, a substantial debate has raged
concerning the very issue dealt with in Jahn.
The official comments to section 1-207 provide the best
evidence that the section was never intended to apply to the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction. The overriding conclusion which can be drawn from them is that section 1-207
was only intended to apply to situations where problems
arise during the performance of an ongoing contract." In
the language of the comment:
This section does not add any new requirement of
language of reservation where not already required
by law, but merely provides a specific measure on
which a party can rely as he makes or concurs in
adjustment in the course of perforany interim
53
mance
This portion of the comment unquestionably seems concerned with aiding a party to a contract who incurs or
makes some change in its performance. In addition, no
language in the comment or the text itself even makes
reference to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.5 " Since
an accord and satisfaction amounts to a new contract, permitting a creditor to apply section 1-207 does not amount
to "a continuation of performance along the lines contemplated by the contract." 5 Rather, this would allow a creditor
to accept tender under a new contract, and utilize it for his
own benefit while totally disregarding the contractual conditions upon which it was delivered. Also, a general practice of the code's framers was to include in the comments to
particular sections any substantial changes made in common

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

one which "occured in an area to which the statute (Uniform
Commercial Code) might not expressly apply, nevertheless, the
rule of the statute should be applied. .. ."
Official comment 2 to U.C.C. § 1-207 (1972 text).
Official comment 2 to U.C.C. § 1-207 (1972 text).
Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction:Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1978).
Official comment 1 to U.C.C. § 1-207 (1972 text).
Reben, Accord and Satisfaction: Conditional Tender by Check Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 539 (1968-69).
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law rules."7 For example, section 1-103 of the code specifically states that the common law applies under the entire
code unless explicitly displaced by it." Although the comments are not law in the sense that the texts of the sections
are, they are utilized by courts more frequently than any
other source when questions of interpretation arise. The
Wyoming Supreme Court relied upon them heavily in
Jahn.5" Without question, the official comments to section
1-207 support the conclusion drawn by the court in Jahn.
Substantial policy considerations also favor the interpretation of section 1-207 discussed in Jahn. Section 1-102 of
the Uniform Commercial Code sets out some of the policies
and purposes of the entire act. One of its purposes is to
"simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.""0 Another policy is to "permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties."61 Finally, the section
expresses a desire on the part of the framers of the code to
"make uniform the law among various jurisdictions."62 By
construing section 1-207 as applicable to the conditional
check situation, thus changing the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction, these policies are not furthered. 3 Such applications merely add complexity to the well-settled law of
accord and satisfaction, rather than simplifying or clarifying it as section 1-102(2) (a) calls for. The use of conditional checks, a common means of out-of-court settlement,
would be severely curtailed rather than given renewed
vitality. Furthermore, the uniformity which exists in relation to common law accord and satisfaction has been wrought
with disparity and confusion where section 1-207 has been
applied to it." The Wyoming Supreme Court's interpreta57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Hawkland, supra note 9, at 331.
Official comment 1 to U.C.C. § 1-103 (1972 text).
Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12, at 830.
U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1972 text).
U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (b) (1972 text).
U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (c) (1972 text).
Rosenthal, supra note 54.
For example, in New York, where Hanna v. Perkins, supra note 39, arose,
other cases decided subsequent to it have totally ignored U.C.C. § 1-207
although factual settings were similar. See Welbourne & Purdy, Inc. v.
Mahon, 288 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, Inc. v. Arrol, 322 N.YS.2d 420 (Civil Ct., City
of New York 1971).
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tion, on the other hand, fosters the growth of the policies
in section 1-102 of the code by keeping the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction, as it now stands, intact. This will in turn
expand the precedential value of the already large body of
case law on the subject. Finally, the Wyoming interpretation
will insure the use of conditional checks as valid, sensible
means for settling commercial disputes."5
CONCLUSION

The law in relation to section 1-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code as it applies to the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction presently remains a judicial muddle.6 However, the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Jahn v.
Burns is a step in the right direction. "7 Under the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction, creditors are given substantial
protection in that all of the requirements of a valid contract
must be met before the doctrine applies.6" Thus, full payment checks are generally not forced upon creditors, but are
rather bargained for in good faith in most situations. It is
hardly, in the words of Professors White and Summers,
an "exquisite form of commercial torture."" By following
the interpretation of section 1-207 found in Jahn, many
disputes between debtors and creditors will continue to be
decided outside the confines of the courtroom, truly a step
forward for the presently overridden court systems.
Robert William Tiedeken

65. White, Does U.C.C. Section 1-207 Apply to the Doctrine of Accord and
Satisfaction by Conditional Check? 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 515 (1977).
66. Hawkland, supra note 9, suggested such a possibility in his article.
67. Jahn v. Burns, supra note 12.
68. White, supra note 65.
69. WHITE AND SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 13-21 (1972).
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